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ABSTRACT  
This paper aims to find out how intense is the competition in Polish commercial banks loan 
market. Using Panzar – Rosse H-statistics and applying several estimation techniques (GLS, 
one-step GMM and two-step GMM) we find that this intensity is sensitive to  the estimator 
applied. Upon analysis of results, one can conclude that competition evolves differently 
across years in Poland. In some years, competition was relatively high, as the H-statistics 
reached the level of 0.75, which is relatively close to perfect competition. In other years it 
gradually decreased reaching its bottom line in 2010, and took upward trend in 2011 and 
2012. Generally, the values of our competitive environment measure indicate at monopolistic 
competition in Poland. 
JEL classification: G21, G28, L1, L16 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
This paper investigates the measurement of competition in the Polish banking sector and is 
driven by scarce evidence in this respect. As has been proven for other industries, competition 
is likely to have far-reaching implications for economic growth, productivity, financial 
stability and, consequently, consumer welfare. Theoretical and empirical research that can 
assess the extent of competition in banking, therefore, has important implications for 
government agencies responsible for the effective regulation and supervision of the financial 
system (Beck et al., 2004; Boyd and De Nicolό, 2005, Boyd et al, 2006; Berger et al, 2009; 
Samaniego, 2010). 
This paper presents estimates of competition in bank loan market in Poland using a well 
grounded approach, indroduced by Panzar and Rosse (1987) and developed in many studies 
(for references see table 1 and 2). The so called Panzar-Rosse H-statistics is defined as the 
sum of the elasticities of a bank’s total revenue with respect to that bank’s input prices 
(Panzar and Rosse, 1987; see also Turk Ariss, 2010). Under monopoly, the H-statistics should 
be smaller than or equal to zero. In contrast, in the models of monopolistic competition and 
perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1. Finally, under perfect 
competition, the H-statistics is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistics indicates a higher 
degree of competition. We apply the methodology used in the estimation of the H-statistics to 
a unique dataset of quarterly individual banks' financial items spanning the years 2008-2012.  
Unlike previous papers which attempt to measure the competition intensity in Poland 
applying annual unbalanced financial data on banking sector available in the Bankscope 
database, we use data handcollected from Monitor Polski B and webpages of commercial 
banks. Where it is necessary we supplement this data which information accessed from Polish 
Financial Supervisory Authority. 
Upon analysis of results, one can conclude that competition evolves differently across 
years in Poland. In some years, competition was relatively high, as the H-statistics reached the 
level of 0.75, which is relatively close to perfect competition. In other years it gradually 
decreased reaching its bottom line in 2010, and took upward trend in 2011 and 2012. 
Generally, the values of our competitive environment measure indicate at monopolistic 
competition in Poland. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of different 
approaches in the literature to measure competition in banking industry across the world as 
well as in the Polish banking market. Section 3 provides description of methodology and data 
applied in the invesitgation. Section 4 presents results of empirical study. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. COMPETITION INTENSITY MEASUREMENT – A LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1. Measures of competition intensity 
 
The actual literature on the measurement of competition is broadly classified into two major 
streams (Bikker, 2004; Tabak et al., 2012). One of those streams include the so-called 
structural approaches which are based on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm 
and use market structure measures such a concentration ratios, number of banks or Herfindahl 
indices.  These indicators measure the actual market shares without allowing inferences on the 
competitive behavior of banks. They are rather crude measures that do not take into account 
that banks with different ownership behave differently and that banks might not compete 
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directly with each other in the same line of business. Moreover, they do not measure the 
competitive conduct of banks at the margin. Thus, they may not be the most appropriate 
indicators for measuring bank competition (Bikker, 2004; Casu and Girardone, 2006 and 
2009; Schaeck et al., 2009, Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009).  
The other stream covers non-structural approaches that have been promoted in the so-
called New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. Within NEIO framework, 
there are two main types of econometric methodologies. One of them is a simulatenous-
equation method, which is represented by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). This method 
estimates the level of competition intensity by simultaneously considering supply and demand 
functions to identify a parameter that measures the behaviors of banks. The most challenging 
issue with this approach is that it requires detailed data on bank financials, which are hardly 
accessible.  
The second type of methodology includes approaches in which the parameters that reflect 
the degree of competition in specific markets are estimated with application of bank-level data 
and specific assumptions on the behavior of banks. The Lerner index, Panzar-Rosse H-
statistics as well as the Boone indicator, fall into this part of the literature. 
The Lerner index is designed with the assumption that market power may also be related to 
profits, in the sense that extremely high profits may be indicative of a lack of competition. 
This index has been widely used in recent bank research (see e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Berger et al., 2009; Fiordelisi and Cipolini, 
2012; Fu, 2014) and indicates a bank’s market power by considering the difference between 
price and marginal cost as a percentage of price. The degree of competition is given by the 
range 0< Lerner index <1. In the case of perfect competition, the Lerner index equals 0; under 
a pure monopoly, the Lerner index equals 1. A Lerner index <0 implies pricing below the 
marginal cost and could result, e.g., from non-optimal bank behavior.  
The Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistics, which measures the reaction of output to input 
prices,  gauges the competitive behavior of banks, but imposes certain restrictive assumptions 
on banks’ cost function. Specifically, under perfect competition, increases in input prices 
cause total revenue and marginal cost to move together, while in imperfect competition they 
do not. However, the inference from this measure derived from the profit-maximizing 
condition is only valid if the market in question is in equilibrium. Estimates of the H-Statistics 
vary widely, as the studies by Claessens and Laeven (2004), Bikker and Spierdijk (2007) and 
Olivero et al. (2011) show, and suffer from a few flaws as is explained in Shaffer (2004).   
With respect to the “Boone” indicator or the profit elasticity (PE) model for measuring 
bank competition, this indicator is often seen as a proxy for competition, in the sense that the 
most efficient banks (and therefore the most competitive ones) will gain market share at the 
cost of the less efficient banks. This measure has gained considerable support recently (Van 
Leuvensteijn et al., 2007, 2011 and 2013; Van Leuvensteijn, 2008; Schaeck and Cihák, 2010; 
Delis, 2012; Tabak et al., 2012).  
While the measures mentioned above have been broadly accepted, there is no consensus 
regarding which is the most suitable indicator for quantifying bank competition (Carbó 
Valverde et al., 2009). As a matter of fact, these measures whose estimation results are 
presented in different research papers often produce divergent conclusions for banking 
markets of the same countries and groups of countries (see e.g. Turk-Ariss, 2010 and Bikker 
and Spierdijk, 2010). This diversity in results can be inferred from Table 1, which reviews 
mostly contemporary literature on competition in the banking industry. Generally, the 
divergence in results may be explained by differences in background methodologies and 
differences in bank data samples applied. Notwithstanding these discrepancies, it seems that 
prevailing competition model in the banking industry is monopolistic competition.  
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Table 1. Review of empirical studies banking competition. 
 
Study by: Period Countries Type of approach Results
Nathan and Never (1989) 1982-1984 Canada
Panzar-Rosse H-
statistics
Perfect competition for 1982 and monopolistic competition competition for 
1983 and 1984
Shaffer and DiSalvo 
(1994)
1970-1986 Pannsykvania (USA)
Panzar-Rosse H-
statistics
Duopoly; high competition
Molyneux (1994) 1986-1989
France, UK, Spain, Germany, 
and Italy
Panzar-Rosse H-
statistics
Monopoly in Italy and monopolistic competition in the rest of countries
Molyneux et al.. (1996) 1986, 1988  Japan
Panzar-Rosse H-
statistics
Monopoly in 1986; monopolistic competition in 1988
Casu and Girardone 
(2006)
1997-2003 15 European countries
Panzar-Rosse H-
statistics
Monopolistic competition in the EU. Values of H-statistics are diversified 
across countries, with the lowest in Greece (0.00) and the highest in 
Luxembourg (0.656).
Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) 1992-2004 The Euro Area Boone indicator
The Boone indicator for Spain, Italy and Germeny suggests comparatively 
competitive banking markets, while Dutch banking sector takes up 
intermediate position.
Schaeck and Cihak (2010) 1995-2005
Two markets: European 
banks and US banks
Boone indicator
In the European sample, the Dutch banking system is the most competitive, 
and is followed by the U.K. and Switzerland. In the US there is a huge 
diversity of results, with Marshall market the most competitive and 
Christian Market the least competive.
Turk-Ariss (2010) 1999-2005
60 developing countires: 
including Africa, East/South 
Asia and Pacific,
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America and 
Caribbean,
and the Middle East.
Lerner index and 
funding adjusted 
Lerner index
The conventional Lerner figures show varying degrees of market power 
across countries, but the figures are generally closely aligned across all 
regions (around 30% price mark-up over marginal costs) except for Latin 
America and the caribbean where the conventional Lerner is as low as 
17%. The estimated efficiency and funding-adjusted Lerner indices also 
vary across countries and regions. 
Olivero et al. (2011) 1996-2006
10 Asian countires and 10 
Latin American countries
Panzar-Rosse H
Most estimates are positive and less than 1 indicates that banks in Latin 
American and Asian countries seem to operate in a monopolistically
competitive environment. Exceptions include India, Korea, and China from 
Asia and Venezuela from Latin America which are shown to have negative 
values of the PRH statistics. This implies a potential monopolistic 
environment or the presence of a structural disequilibrium
in their banking markets. Banking industries in Latin America seem to be 
more competitive than those in Asia. While the sample mean of the PRH 
statistics estimated using the static revenue equation is 0.379 for Latin 
American banking, it is only 0.122 for Asian banking. Similarly, while the 
sample mean for the dynamic panel estimation is 0.704 for Latin America, it 
is only 0.284 for Asia.
Beck et al.. (2011) 1994-2009 79 countries Lerner index The values of the index are positive and suggest monopolistic competition
Tabak et al. (2011) 2001-2008
10 Latin American countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Rep., Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Venezuela
Boone indicator
The values of the Boone indicator exhibit strong diversity, and therefore the 
competition intensity is very diversified, both across countries and across 
time. As there are not available reference values for specific models of 
competition in the banking market, we cannot make inferences in this 
subject.
Noth (2011) 1996-2006 Germany Lerner index The values of the index are positive and suggest monopolistic competition
Stavarek and Repkova 
(2011)
2001-2009 Czech Republic
Panzar-Rosse H-
statistics
Highly competitive market in period 2001-2005 and monopolistic 
competition in 2005-2009.
Cipollini and Fiordelisi 
(2012)
1996-2009
European countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom
Lerner index The mean value of the Lerner index suggests monopolistic competition
Casu and Girardone 
(2012)
2000-2005
European countries: France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, UK
Lerner index 
Values of both indices are diversified across time and across countries, and 
suggest monopolisitc competition. Spanish and Italian banking industries 
seem to be the most competitive , with Lerner index close to 0.
Carbo-Valvedere et al. 
(2012)
1996-2012 23 OECD countries Lerner index 
Values of both indices are diversified across time and across countries, and 
suggest monopolisitc competition. 
Xu et al. (2013) 1996-2008 China
Lerner index, 
elasticity adjusted 
Lerner index, Boone 
indicator
The results for both the traditional Lerner index and the elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner index suggest a general increasing level of bank competition up to 
around 2002 and a decreasing level of bank competition afterwards. The 
values of the Lerner index indicate monopolistic competition. In general, the 
development of the yearly PE indicator suggests that competitive conditions 
in Chinese loan markets improved, especially after WTO accession in 2001. 
As for the Boone indicator competition increased sharply during 2001–2003 
and then declined up to 2005. It then intensified again, followed by a slight 
decrease in 2007 and 2008. 
Fu et al. (2014) 2003-2010
Asia Pacific conutries: 
Australia, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonsia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Phillipines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand
Lerner index and 
efficiency adjusted 
Lerner index
Values of both indices are diversified across time and across countries, and 
suggest monopolisitc competition. The trend for the Lerner index
(non-structural measure) is descending between 2005 and 2008 suggesting 
a decrease in pricing power. The Lerner index exhibits varying degrees of 
market power across countries. Singapore has the highest efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index
value (0.44), whereas Taiwan has the lowest value (0.22)  
Source: Authors’ analysis of papers cited in the table. 
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2.2. Competition intensity in Poland – the review of empirical evidence 
 
The empirical evidence on the intensity of competition in Polish banking industry is rather 
scant. The available studies include cross country analyses in which Polish banking market is 
one of many other banking markets (see e.g. Beck et al., 2004; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; 
Turk-Ariss, 2010; Agoraki et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2013; Mirzaei et al., 2013) and only a few 
papers focusing on the Polish banks alone (Pawłowska 2005, 2010, 2012). These analyses 
apply a wide range of competition measures, from simple market structure indicators, such as 
concentration ratio or HHI (see e.g. Pawłowska, 2012; Mirzaei et al., 2013;) to indicators 
justified in the NEIO literature, i.e. the Lerner index (see e.g.  Pawłowska, 2012; Turk-Ariss, 
2010; Agoraki et al., 2012) and the Panzar-Rosse H – Statisitcs (see e.g. Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004; Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008; Pawłowska, 2005; 2010; 2012). The summary of 
the studies which apply NEIO approaches are presented in Table 2. 
The results for both the Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistics show varying degrees 
of market power across year and suggest a monopolistic competition in the Polish banking 
industry. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistics has been usually estimated in a regression in which 
dependent variable is interest income normalized by total assets or loans (II/A or II/L). 
Generally, it can be seen that the so-called H-statistics developed by Panzar and Rosse has 
been employed in a small number of empirical studies on bank competition in Poland 
(Pawłowska, 2010, 2012).  
As can be inferred from Table 2 the estimation techniques applied to compute the H-
statistics are diversified, and include pooled OLS, GLS and GMM. It is worth noting here that 
application of pooled OLS estimator to dynamic panel data is controversial, as structural 
parameters obtained with its application are usually biased (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Greene, 
2012; Baltagi, 2005).  
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Table 2. Review of empirical studies measuring competition in Polish banking industry 
(commercial banks) 
Study by:
Type of measure of 
comeptition intensity 
Level of the competition 
intensity indicator
Model of the 
competition
Time 
period of 
analysis
Type of 
dependent 
variable
Estimation 
technique
Claessens and Laeven 
(2004)
Panzar-Rosse H-
Statisitcs
0.77
Monopolisitc 
competition
1994-2001
Normalized 
interest income
Average of 
several H-
statistics obtained 
in application of 
several versions of 
OLS and GLS.
Pawłowska (2005)
Panzar-Rosse H-
Statisitcs
0.75 in years 1997-1998; 
0.78 in years 1998-1999; 
0.60in  years 1999-2000; 
0.65 in years 2000-2001; 
0.84 in years 2001-2002.
Monopolisitc 
competition
1997-2002
Normalized 
interest income
n.a.
Bikker and Spierdijk 
(2008)
Panzar-Rosse H-
Statisitcs
0.03 in 2004
Monopolisitc 
competition
1994-2004
Non-Normalized 
interest income
FE GLS, 
Recursive least 
squares
Pawłowska (2010)
Panzar-Rosse H-
Statisitcs
0.62 in years 1997-2007; 
0.51 in years 1997-1998; 
0.64 in years 1999-2003; 
0.60 in years 2004-2007.
Monopolisitc 
competition
1997-2007
Normalized 
interest income
FE GLS
0.55 (FE), 0.49 (OLS), 
0.60 (GMM) in years 
1997-2001; 
0.78 (FE), 0.79 (OLS), 
0.84(GMM) in years 
2002-2007;
0.82 (FE), 0.88 (OLS), 
0.82 (GMM) in years 
2008-2009.
Turk-Ariss (2010) Lerner index
Conventional Lerner: 
0.2334;                 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner: 
0.5095;                   
Funding - adjusted Lerner: 
0.4593.
Monopolisitc 
competition
1999-2005
Marginal cost 
function
FE GLS
Pawłowska (2012) Lerner index
0.38 in 1997; 0.38 in 
1998; 0.29 in 1999; 0.42 
in 2000; 0.30 in 2001; 
0.097 in 2002; 0.14 in 
2003; 0.19 in 2004; 0.28 
in 2005; 0.27 in 2006; 
0.26 in 2007; 0.37 in 
2008; 0.42 in 2009.
Monopolisitc 
competition
1997-2009
Marginal cost 
function
FE GLS
Monopolisitc 
competition
1997-2009
Normalized 
interest income
FE GLS, pooled 
OLS, GMM
Panzar-Rosse H-
Statisitcs
Pawsłowska (2012)
 
Source:  Claessens and Laeven (2004), Bikker and Spierdijk (2005), Pawłowska (2005, 2010, 2012),  Turk-Ariss 
(2010). 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
We use the Panzar-Rosse approach to assess the competitive nature of banking market in 
Poland. The so-called H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse has been employed in 
a small number of empirical studies on bank competition in Poland (Pawłowska, 2010, 2012). 
The H-statistic is defined as the sum of the elasticities of a bank’s total revenue with respect 
to that bank’s input prices (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987; see also Turk 
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Ariss, 2010). Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero. In 
contrast, in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic 
should be between 0 and 1. Finally, under perfect competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. 
Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition. Nathan and Neave 
(1989) point out that this interpretation assumes the the test is undertaken on observations that 
are in the long run equilibrium. We therefore also test whether the observations which we 
apply in our study are in long-run equilibrium.  
3.1.  Competitive environment test  
To approximate the H-statistic empirically, we follow Bikker and Haaf (2002), Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) and Schaeck et al. (2009): 
 
Eq. (1) 
ititkitititit controlsPCEPPEAFRTAII   lnlnln_ln 321   
where:  
 the superscript i denotes bank i, and the uperscript t denotes quarter t; 
 ln_II_TA – interest revenue to total assets (this our proxy for output price); 
 ln_AFR – average funding rate, i.e. the ratio of interest expenses to total assets;  
 ln_PPE – price of personal expediture is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets 
(proxy for the price of labor);  
 ln_PCE – price of capital expediture, i.e. the ratio of other operating and 
administrative expenses to fixed assets (proxy for price of fixed capital);  
 controls – control variables, including: loans to assets ratio (ln_LNS_TA); stable 
funding to average liabilities ratio (ln_DPS_F); bank own funds to illiquid assets ratio 
(ln_EQ_TA), non-interest income (ln_OI_II). 
 εit – random error 
 
Here, H = β1 + β2 + β3.  
 
We begin with a standard model that takes into consideration the panel nature of data, i.e. 
random-effects generalised least squares regression (GLS). As an alternative we consider 
a fixed effects regression. In both models the same set of explanatory variables was used, 
selected in accordance with the theory and the results of empirical studies examined. The 
choice between fixed effects and random effects models may be justified by theory – in 
general fixed-effects model should be used if the differences between individuals may be 
captured through different constant value in the model, and it is not always possible to assume 
that individual random effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, which is assumed 
in the random effects model (Baltagi, 2005); may be reflected in other empirical studies 
(autors adapting the Panzar-Rosse approach P-R use fixed effects models); may be verified by 
statistical test (e.g. Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests). 
Bikker et al. (2007) and Bikker et al. (2012) demonstrate that taking interest income as 
share of total assets, or the inclusion of scale variables as explanatory variables, may lead to 
overestimate competition and distorted tests results. Instead, they suggest using unscaled 
variables, i.e. using interest income, as the dependent variable. However, for the analysis of 
the effect of competition on bank risk we use the scaled version of the H-statistics, as we 
would like to be able to compare our results with those of Pawłowska (2010, 2012).  
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3.2. Equilibrium test 
Since the PR model is only valid if the market is in the long run equilibrium, we  test for this 
assumption by estimating the following equation for the banking sector in Poland: 
 
Eq. (2) 
ititkitititit controlsPCEPPEAFRTAROA   lnlnln_ln 321   
 
Where ROA is the return on assets. We define equilibrium E-statistics as β1 + β2 + β3. We 
test whether E=0, using F-test. If rejected, the market is assumed not to be in equilibrium. The 
idea beind this test is that, in equilibrium, risk-adjusted rates of return should be equal across 
banks and returns on bank assets should not be related to input prices. This approach for 
testing whether the observations are in long-run equilibrium has previously been used in the 
literature (see e.g. Shaffer, 1982; Molyneux et al., 1996; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; 
Schaeck et al., 2009). 
 
3.3. Dynamic panel model 
An alternative method to estimate the H-statistic by Panzar and Rosse is a dynamic model, 
taking into account the lagged endogenous variables. Dynamic panel estimation eliminates the 
need for a market equilibrium assumption. This model requires an appropriate estimation 
procedure, due to the failure to meet the assumptions of the lack of correlation between the 
explanatory variable and a random component. We use the estimation procedure proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and its modification proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). This 
approach involves the use of appropriate instruments for the explanatory variables correlated 
with a random component and is optimal for short time dimension panels. 
 
Eq. (3) 
ititkititititit controlsPCEPPEAFRTAIITAII    lnlnln_ln_ln 3211
 
3.4. Data  
 
We use bank level data from financial statements available in Monitor Polski B, on web pages 
of commercial banks and supplement this information with data which can be accessed from 
the Polish Financial Supervisory Authority. We have quartely panel data for the years 2008-
2012, and we include 53 commercial banks, for which, our dataset was compiled. In Table 3  
and 4 is given summary information on data used in this research, i.e. descriptive statistics 
and correlation matrix. Additionally, in Figure A included in the Appendix we depict 
distribution charts of dependent variable and main independent variables. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statisitcs 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    ln_II_TA |       963   -4.259408    .4659184  -6.524233   -2.90554 
      ln_AFR |       960   -4.911418    .4165856  -6.845102  -3.663811 
      ln_PPE |       961   -5.806221    .7057032  -8.001258  -3.161367 
      ln_PCE |       962    .2623982    1.021538  -1.729499   4.274213 
   ln_LNS_TA |       967   -.3716586    .3279276  -2.155067  -.0027834 
    ln_DPS_F |       957    4.001777    .4272364   1.895374   5.502788 
    ln_EQ_TA |       963    2.099587    1.351569  -.1566538   6.873696 
    ln_OI_II |       815    3.986177    1.253111  -1.542312   9.603113 
      ln_ROA |       768   -.1679723    1.060621  -5.146301   2.600866 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix 
 
             | ln_II_TA   ln_AFR   ln_PPE   ln_PCE ln_LNS~A ln_DPS_F ln_EQ_TA ln_OI_II   ln_ROA 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ln_II_TA |   1.0000 
      ln_AFR |   0.6607   1.0000 
      ln_PPE |   0.6444   0.1387   1.0000 
      ln_PCE |  -0.1280  -0.1217  -0.1987   1.0000 
   ln_LNS_TA |   0.2602   0.0871   0.0596   0.3126   1.0000 
    ln_DPS_F |   0.4084   0.3422   0.1398  -0.2623   0.3699   1.0000 
    ln_EQ_TA |  -0.3707  -0.3266  -0.4593   0.6620   0.3248  -0.1864   1.0000 
    ln_OI_II |  -0.4031  -0.0511  -0.1778  -0.0995  -0.3680  -0.3158  -0.1397   1.0000 
      ln_ROA |   0.0473  -0.1339   0.0582   0.1322   0.1066  -0.1560   0.1458   0.0767   1.0000 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
4.  ESTIMATION RESULTS  
4.1. Full sample estimation   
In this section we present full sample estimation of our model specified following Eq. (1)-(3). 
In the first step we show results of GLS fixed effects estimation. Next, we proceed to analysis 
of long-run equilibrium. And in the last step we show results of GMM dynamic estimation. 
Following previous studies estimating the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; Pawłowska, 2012) in our paper we also apply the conventional OLS technique. 
However, as the competition measures estimated with OLS are biased, we include these 
results – just for informative purposes, in table in Appendix. 
4.1.1. GLS full sample estimation   
 
In order to select an appropriate version of GLS model (i.e. between fixed or random 
effects) we have tested the validity of the panel model using the Breusch-Pagan test and 
Hausman test.  
The Breusch-Pagan test, based on Lagrange multipliers, rejected the null hypothesis of 
a constant variance, i.e. it must be held that the random effects are important and that a model 
of pooled regresion should not be built. 
Hausman test assumes that the individual effects are independent of the explanatory 
variables. If this hypothesis holds, both fixed effect and random effect estimators are 
unbiased, but the random effect estimator is considered as more efficient. In contrast, the 
rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of an alternative means that fixed effect estimator is 
consistent or an error in the model specification occured. Hausman test, comparing 
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coefficients estimated by fixed and random effects models, indicates no statistically 
significant difference, thus the assumption of fixed effects should be considered correct.  
 
Table 5. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test and Hausman test  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
        ln_II_TA[kod,t] = Xb + u[kod] + e[kod,t] 
 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                ln_II_TA |   .1550853       .3938087 
                       e |   .0098195       .0990935 
                       u |   .0252608       .1589364 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                             chibar2(01) =  2292.41 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ln_AFR |    .4901799     .4861424        .0040374        .0031853 
      ln_PPE |      .14803      .167303       -.0192729        .0051089 
      ln_PCE |    .0646951     .0552645        .0094306        .0063224 
   ln_LNS_TA |    .3150666     .3168145        -.001748        .0054235 
    ln_DPS_F |    .1287467     .1286282        .0001185        .0054544 
    ln_EQ_TA |   -.0434595    -.0465854        .0031259        .0033299 
    ln_OI_II |   -.0495534    -.0530196        .0034662        .0011208 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       29.41 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0001 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
The selected version of panel model (fixed effects) is presented in Table 6. In appendix we 
also present the estimation results for our baseline model (i.e. with random effects). 
Among the results of estimation we should focus on the following coefficients – R2: 
within=0,68 means that 68% of intragroup diversification has been explained by the 
explanatory variables; between=0,76 means that 76% differentiation of endogenous variable 
between banks has been explained by the explanatory variables; overall=0,74 means that  
74% of overall differentaition of endogenous variable has been explained by the explanatory 
variables. The explanation of differentiation can be considered satisfactory.  
The coefficients in estimated models, are in line with expectations – the sign of 
ln_LNS_TA turned out to be positive in the revenue equation – which can be interpreted as 
the fact that banks compensate themselves for credit risk by surcharges on the lending rate, 
which increases interest income. The influence of ln_DPS_F on interest income is rather 
unpredictable. The ln_EQ_TA has a negative impact on interest income, i.e. lower equity 
ratio implies more interest income. However, capital requirements increase as the risk 
increases, suggesting a positive sign of a coefficient. 
In addition, the diagnostic tests for the accuracy of constructed fixed effects model were 
performed. The test for residuals normality – graphical analysis of the distributions shows 
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a high similarity with the normal distribution and the concentration of the residues around 
zero even higher than in a normal distribution (see Figure B in Appendix). Nevertheless, the 
Jarque-Bera test rejects the hypothesis that the disturbances are normally distributed.  
 
Table 6. Estimation of competition intensity using fixed-effects GLS regression.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       809 
Group variable: kod                             Number of groups   =        53 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6798                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.7616                                        avg =      15.3 
       overall = 0.7368                                        max =        20 
 
                                                F(7,749)           =    227.12 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0959                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    ln_II_TA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ln_AFR |   .4901799   .0164554    29.79   0.000     .4578756    .5224841 
      ln_PPE |     .14803   .0151315     9.78   0.000     .1183248    .1777353 
      ln_PCE |   .0646951   .0141993     4.56   0.000     .0368199    .0925704 
   ln_LNS_TA |   .3150666   .0271728    11.59   0.000     .2617226    .3684105 
    ln_DPS_F |   .1287467   .0196612     6.55   0.000     .0901491    .1673443 
    ln_EQ_TA |  -.0434595   .0099333    -4.38   0.000    -.0629601    -.023959 
    ln_OI_II |  -.0495534   .0052672    -9.41   0.000    -.0598936   -.0392132 
       _cons |  -1.104434   .1340167    -8.24   0.000    -1.367527   -.8413407 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .19314069 
     sigma_e |  .09909347 
         rho |  .79161877   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(52, 749) =    34.59             Prob > F = 0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
 
We have also tested H-statistic for estimated fixed effect model. The null hypothesis Hfe = 
0 had to be rejected (F(1, 749) = 670.43 and prob = 0.0000) as well as the hypothesis Hfe = 1 
(F(1,749) = 119.77 and prob = 0.0000). That means that banking sector in Poland can be 
described as monopolistic competition – the H-statistic is between 0 and 1. 
4.1.2. Testing for long-run equilibrium   
 
As has been metioned in the previous section, the PR model is only valid if the market is in 
the long run equilibrium. This long run-equilibrium is usually tested with a model in which 
dependent varable is ROA, and independent variables are the same as in our baseline model 
(i.e. Eq.(1)). For detailed estimation results of Eq.(2) please refer to Table E included in 
Appendix. Here we focus only on the conclusions which are derived from this test. First, the 
hypothesis on the long-run equilibrium in the Polish banking sector (E = β1 + β2 + β3 = 0) 
has to be rejected at the significance level of 5% (F(1, 608) = 10.92, prob = 0.0010). Second, 
the hypothesis  that E = 1 cannot be rejected (F(1, 608) = 0.54, prob = 0.4647), which means 
that it cannot be stated that H <0 and there is no long-run equilibrium. However, as is argued 
by Matthews et al. (2007) the restirction that E=0 (i.e. market equilibrium) is necessary for the 
perfect competition case, but not for the monopolistic competition case, which is typical of 
the Polish banking sector (see also Stavarek and Repkova, 2011).  
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Although the results suggest that over the whole estimation period the market was not in 
equilibrium, we cannot reject this hypothesis for the sub-periods. For particular years the 
hypothesis that E= 0 cannot be rejected (see Table 7).  
 
Table 7. Equilibrium test for sub-periods. 
2008:  F(1, 92) = 0.61 prob = 0.4354 
2009:  F(1, 69) = 0.86 prob = 0.3575 
2010:  F(1, 86) = 0.23 prob = 0.6350 
2011:  F(1, 89) = 0.21 prob = 0.6506 
2012:  F(1, 85) = 4.70 prob = 0.0330. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
4.1.3. Dynamic estimation   
Due to the fact that our dataset exhibits dynamic features we follow procedure developed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) and further elaborated by Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
estimate Eq.(3) which includes lagged dependent variable. Our results of estimation of the 
dynamic panel model with lagged dependent variable are shown in Table 8 below. 
 
Table 8. Estimation of competition intensity using two-step GMM (Arellano-Bond / 
Blundell-Bond) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
System dynamic panel-data estimation         Number of obs         =       762 
Group variable: kod                          Number of groups      =        53 
Time variable: kw 
                                             Obs per group:    min =         2 
                                                               avg =  14.37736 
                                                               max =        19 
 
Number of instruments =     43               Wald chi2(7)          =   4521.51 
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000 
Two-step results 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    ln_II_TA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ln_II_TA | 
         L1. |   .0807785   .0227319     3.55   0.000     .0362248    .1253323 
             | 
      ln_AFR |   .5335559   .0209704    25.44   0.000     .4924546    .5746572 
      ln_PPE |   .2112995   .0125854    16.79   0.000     .1866325    .2359665 
      ln_PCE |  -.0148803    .008457    -1.76   0.078    -.0314557    .0016952 
   ln_LNS_TA |   .1395117   .0199613     6.99   0.000     .1003883     .178635 
    ln_DPS_F |   .0539524   .0250939     2.15   0.032     .0047693    .1031355 
    ln_OI_II |  -.0464487   .0061119    -7.60   0.000    -.0584277   -.0344697 
       _cons |  -.0271004   .1832249    -0.15   0.882    -.3862145    .3320137 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Warning: gmm two-step standard errors are biased; robust standard  
         errors are recommended. 
Instruments for differenced equation 
        GMM-type: L(2/2).ln_II_TA 
        Standard: D.ln_AFR D.ln_PPE D.ln_PCE D.ln_LNS_TA D.ln_DPS_F 
                  D.ln_OI_II 
Instruments for level equation 
        GMM-type: LD.ln_II_TA 
        Standard: _cons 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
As the quality of estimators in dynamic GMM model depends on several tests, we conduct 
such testing (see Table 9). The first is Arellano-Bond test regarding autocorrelation of 
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residuals. We find that there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis of absence of 
autocorrelation. The other is the Sargan test of over-identyfying restrictions, which checks 
whether orthogonality conditions have been sufficiently met. Sargan test suggests proper 
application of the instruments. 
 
Table 9. Arellano-Bond test and Sargan test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors 
  +-----------------------+ 
  |Order |  z     Prob > z| 
  |------+----------------| 
  |   1  |-2.4454  0.0145 | 
  |   2  |-.65176  0.5146 | 
  |   3  |-.87162  0.3834 | 
  |   4  | .62739  0.5304 | 
  +-----------------------+ 
   H0: no autocorrelation  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
        H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid 
 
        chi2(35)     =  43.10649 
        Prob > chi2  =    0.1633 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
Due to the fact that the model was estimated using a two-step procedure, errors of 
estimators can be biased, so the one-step procedure has been used to ensure the accuracy of 
standard errors. This action resulted in elimination of potential bias of the results. The 
analysis of the coefficients determined followig a two-step and one-step methods, leads to the 
conclusion that all used variables are statistically significant. Detailed estimation results for 
one-step estimation can be found in Table C in the Appendix. 
Following previous research mentioned in this paper we test the H-statistics for our 
dynamic panel model. The null hypothesis H2step = 0 had to be rejected (Chi2(1) = 910.80 and 
prob = 0.0000) as well as the hypothesis H2step = 1 (Chi2(1) =  154.83 and prob = 0.0000). 
This confirms earlier results that banking sector in Poland can be described as monopolistic 
competition – the values of H-statistics are between 0 and 1. 
4.2.  Developments of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics over time.  
 
In this section we present the results from the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics estimation by year to 
consider the time evolution of competition. Table 9 shows, by year, the  
H-statistics for Polish commercial banks, obtained from three different estimation methods 
(FE GLS, two-step GMM and one-step GMM). Since each estimation technique has some 
specific advantages and disadvantages, we take the average of the three estimates as our 
measure of competition intensity in Poland. Such procedure has also been applied by 
Claessens and Laeven (2004:571). Upon analysis of these results, one can conclude that 
competition evolves differently across years in Poland. In some years, competition was 
relatively high, as the H-statistics reached the level of 0.75, which is relatively close to perfect 
competition (in 2008). Then it gradually decreased reaching its bottom line in 2010, and has 
been slightly increasing in since then.  Generally, the values of our competitive environment 
measure indicate at monopolistic competition in Poland. Therefore, our results are close to 
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those presented in other studies (see e.g. Pawłowska, 2005, 2010, 2012 and Bikker and 
Spierdijk, 2010). 
 
Table 9. Developments of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics over time – average competitive 
indicator  
Type of H-statisitcs 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
321  Hfe  0.560344 0.631425 0.452462 0.686967 0.721939 
3212  stepH  0.764525 0.761476 0.612405 0.721676 0.672786 
3211  stepH  0.925244 0.663498 0.675446 0.66438 0.687938 
H-average 0.750038 0.685466 0.580104 0.691008 0.694221 
Note: this table presents Panzar-Rosse H-statistics that depends on time and is calculated with application of FE 
GLS (Hfe), 2-step GMM (H2step) and 1-step GMM (H1step) estimators. Under monopoly, the H-statistic 
should be smaller than or equal to zero; in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the 
H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1; under perfect competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger 
H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition. Hfe denotes the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics calculated for 
consecutive years 2008-2012. The β1, β2, and β3 are elasticity coefficients of input prices, i.e. price of deposits, 
labor and capital, respectively.  The values of betas are presented in tables H, I, J in the Appendix. 
5. CONSLUSIONS  
This paper presents estimates of competition in bank loan market in Poland using a well 
grounded approach, indroduced by Panzar and Rosse (1987) and developed in many studies.  
Unlike previous papers which attempt to measure the competition intensity in Poland 
applying annual unbalanced financial data on banking sector available in the Bankscope 
database, we use data which where handcollected from Monitor Polski B and webpages of 
commercial banks. Where it is necessary we supplement this data which information accessed 
from Polish Financial Supervisory Authority. 
Upon analysis of results, one can conclude that competition evolves differently across 
years in Poland. In some years, competition was relatively high, as the H-statistics reached the 
level of 0.75, which is relatively close to perfect competition. In other years it gradually 
decreased reaching its bottom line in 2010, and took upward trend in 2011 and 2012. 
Generally, the values of our competitive environment measure indicate at monopolistic 
competition in Poland. 
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7. APPENDICES 
Figure A. Distribution chart of dependent and independent variables 
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Figure B. Normality test of residuals of model.  
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Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality                                                   
 
Variable  |    Obs   Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis)   
----------+----------------------------------- 
residuals |    809   0.0262         0.0000  
------- joint ------ 
          |   adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
----------+----------------------------------- 
residuals |        28.29         0.0000 
 
 
Table A. Estimation of competition intensity using Random-Effects GLS regression.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       809 
Group variable: kod                             Number of groups   =        53 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6785                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.7840                                        avg =      15.3 
       overall = 0.7551                                        max =        20 
 
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =   1778.30 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    ln_II_TA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ln_AFR |   .4861424   .0161442    30.11   0.000     .4545004    .5177845 
      ln_PPE |    .167303    .014243    11.75   0.000     .1393872    .1952187 
      ln_PCE |   .0552645   .0127141     4.35   0.000     .0303453    .0801838 
   ln_LNS_TA |   .3168145   .0266261    11.90   0.000     .2646284    .3690006 
    ln_DPS_F |   .1286282   .0188895     6.81   0.000     .0916055    .1656509 
    ln_EQ_TA |  -.0465854   .0093586    -4.98   0.000    -.0649279   -.0282429 
    ln_OI_II |  -.0530196   .0051466   -10.30   0.000    -.0631067   -.0429325 
       _cons |  -.9923687   .1305376    -7.60   0.000    -1.248218   -.7365197 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .15893638 
     sigma_e |  .09909347 
         rho |  .72008453   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table B. Estimation results for long run equilibirum test.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       667 
Group variable: kod                             Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0864                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.0006                                        avg =      12.8 
       overall = 0.0123                                        max =        20 
 
                                                F(7,608)           =      8.21 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5255                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      ln_ROA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ln_AFR |   .1938643   .1432847     1.35   0.177    -.0875287    .4752572 
      ln_PPE |   .8708188     .15066     5.78   0.000     .5749416    1.166696 
      ln_PCE |    -.24594   .1345582    -1.83   0.068    -.5101952    .0183152 
   ln_LNS_TA |   .6641539   .3003268     2.21   0.027     .0743502    1.253958 
    ln_DPS_F |   .2897228   .1794667     1.61   0.107    -.0627272    .6421727 
    ln_EQ_TA |   .2770827   .0969971     2.86   0.004     .0865926    .4675728 
    ln_OI_II |   .2003522   .0463723     4.32   0.000     .1092829    .2914216 
       _cons |   3.575226   1.260256     2.84   0.005     1.100243    6.050209 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .94406884 
     sigma_e |  .77636536 
         rho |  .59655992   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51, 608) =     8.35             Prob > F = 0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table C. Estimation of competition intensity using one-step GMM (Arellano-Bond) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
System dynamic panel-data estimation         Number of obs         =       762 
Group variable: kod                          Number of groups      =        53 
Time variable: kw 
                                             Obs per group:    min =         2 
                                                               avg =  14.37736 
                                                               max =        19 
 
Number of instruments =     43               Wald chi2(7)          =   3491.58 
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000 
One-step results 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    ln_II_TA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ln_II_TA | 
         L1. |   .0976505   .0239892     4.07   0.000     .0506325    .1446685 
             | 
      ln_AFR |   .5286487   .0165493    31.94   0.000     .4962126    .5610848 
      ln_PPE |   .2014377   .0134961    14.93   0.000     .1749857    .2278896 
      ln_PCE |  -.0220209   .0113382    -1.94   0.052    -.0442433    .0002015 
   ln_LNS_TA |   .1569258   .0293449     5.35   0.000     .0994109    .2144406 
    ln_DPS_F |   .0787877   .0213136     3.70   0.000     .0370139    .1205615 
    ln_OI_II |  -.0481278   .0046601   -10.33   0.000    -.0572615   -.0389941 
       _cons |  -.1267662   .1318421    -0.96   0.336     -.385172    .1316395 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for differenced equation 
        GMM-type: L(2/2).ln_II_TA 
        Standard: D.ln_AFR D.ln_PPE D.ln_PCE D.ln_LNS_TA D.ln_DPS_F 
                  D.ln_OI_II 
Instruments for level equation 
        GMM-type: LD.ln_II_TA 
        Standard: _cons 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table D. Estimation of competition intensity using  OLS regression – full sample results 
and developments of H-statistics over years 2008-2012. 
ln_II_TA 2008-2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ln_AFR 
.4977472 
(28.28)***    
.4163619 
(6.86)*** 
.5097404 
(10.88)***   
.5243275 
(12.04)*** 
.5234264 
(11.92)***   
.5354117 
(12.08)*** 
ln_PPE 
.2759675 
(24.01)***   
.241172 
(10.04)*** 
.1879862 
(7.29)***   
.3236799 
(11.87)*** 
.3339405 
(13.46)*** 
.3693754 
(13.73)*** 
ln_PCE 
.0049034 
(0.53)   
.0125971 
(0.67) 
-.0144745 
(-0.69) 
.0226756 
(0.97) 
-.0090615 
(-0.42) 
-.0699899 
(-3.18)*** 
ln_LNS_TA 
.2335461 
(7.94)***    
.2041374 
(2.91)*** 
.4390757 
(6.54)*** 
.1296609 
(1.79)* 
.1950818 
(2.97)*** 
.2361077 
(3.36)*** 
ln_DPS_F 
.0468171 
(2.45)**   
.0767887 
(2.35)*** 
-.0170417 
(-0.35) 
.1180823 
(2.13)** 
-.0040451 
(-0.07) 
-.1662703 
(-2.66)*** 
ln_EQ_TA 
-.0184791 
(-2.34)**   
-.0186218 
(-1.28) 
-.0486098 
(-2.68)*** 
.0011085 
(0.05) 
-.0096219 
(-0.53) 
.0189863 
(0.99) 
ln_OI_TA 
-.0753027 
(-13.25)***   
-.0618512 
(-5.53)*** 
-.0999108 
(-7.87)*** 
-.0642954 
(-5.23)*** 
-.0863154 
(-6.20)*** 
-.089875 
(-6.47)*** 
cons 
.0364708 
(0.25) 
-.7211764 
(-1.89)* 
.0358204 
(0.09) 
.0506134 
(0.12) 
.7442485 
(1.76)* 
1.631984 
(3.69)*** 
R^2 
 
0.8004 0.7346 0.8110 0.8343 0.8385 0.8195 
Wald Test [F test] 
458.77 
[p=0.000] 
63.66 
[p=0.000] 
96.22 
[p=0.000] 
109.30 
[p=0.000] 
112.74 
[p=0.000] 
95.33 
[p=0.000] 
321  Hfe  0.778618 0.670131 0.683252 0.870683 0.848305 0.834797 
H0: Hfe = 0 
Test F 
1391.88 
[p=0.000] 
113.48 
[p=0.000] 
163.44 
[p=0.000] 
297.39  
[p=0.000] 
341.07  
[p=0.000] 
343.41  
[p=0.000] 
H1: Hfe = 1 
Test F 
112.52 
[p=0.000] 
27.50 
[p=0.000] 
35.12 
[p=0.000] 
6.56  
[p=0.0114] 
10.91  
[p=0.0012] 
13.45  
[p=0.0003] 
Note: this table presents Panzar-Rosse H-statistics that depends on time and is calculated with application of 
OLS estimator. Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero; in the models of 
monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1; under perfect 
competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition. 
Hfe denotes the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics calculated for consecutive years 2008-2012. The β1, β2, and β3 are 
elasticity coefficients of input prices, i.e. price of deposits, labor and capital, respectively.  This table reports 
coefficients and t–statistics (in parentheses), with *,**,*** representing significance at the 10%,5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
 
Table E. Test for long-run equilibrium. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     667 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   659) =    9.30 
       Model |  61.5233837     7  8.78905482           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  623.125784   659  .945562646           R-squared     =  0.0899 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0802 
       Total |  684.649167   666  1.02800175           Root MSE      =   .9724 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      ln_ROA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ln_AFR |  -.1600596   .1040341    -1.54   0.124    -.3643378    .0442186 
      ln_PPE |   .2859496   .0760662     3.76   0.000     .1365883    .4353109 
      ln_PCE |  -.0232463   .0564896    -0.41   0.681    -.1341675    .0876749 
   ln_LNS_TA |   .6575154   .1890942     3.48   0.001     .2862157    1.028815 
    ln_DPS_F |  -.3615469   .1126508    -3.21   0.001    -.5827446   -.1403492 
    ln_EQ_TA |   .1176192   .0477069     2.47   0.014     .0239433    .2112951 
    ln_OI_II |    .110613   .0345371     3.20   0.001     .0427969     .178429 
       _cons |    1.66139   .8889757     1.87   0.062    -.0841766    3.406956 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table F. Robustness test – GLS FE estimation of model in which control variable is 
bank size (ln_TA). 
ln_II 2008-2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ln_AFR 
.4900888 
(29.77)*** 
.5591607 
(14.68)*** 
.5936586 
(12.25)*** 
.2733253 
(5.38)*** 
    .592725 
(14.38)***   
.6180466 
(11.50)*** 
ln_PPE 
.1417392 
(7.84)*** 
-.0149183 
(-0.49) 
-.0907387 
(-1.35)   
.0362019 
(1.12) 
.0294857 
(0.92) 
.1171257 
(3.17)*** 
ln_PCE 
.0674123 
(4.55)*** 
.0311811 
(1.34) 
.0777534 
(1.46)   
.044142 
(1.62)  
.0504847 
(1.84)*   
-.0176835 
(-0.57) 
ln_LNS_TA 
.3135659 
(11.49)*** 
.0722257 
(1.45) 
.3807187 
(4.59)***   
.2923217 
(4.56)*** 
.2916342 
(4.05)*** 
.2227959 
(2.90)*** 
ln_DPS_F 
.131287 
(6.54)*** 
.035194 
(0.94) 
.0349559 
(0.45) 
.5801783 
(5.06)***   
.1118387 
(0.99)   
-.0582737 
(-0.47) 
ln_EQ_TA 
-.0434754 
(-4.37)*** 
.0973151 
(2.27)** 
.1875775 
(2.44)**   
.100341 
(1.72)*   
.0409185 
(1.02)   
-.0060491 
(-0.19)   
ln_OI_TA 
-.0494425 
(-9.38)*** 
-.0199044 
(-2.96)*** 
-.062547  
(-5.36)***   
-.0120398 
(-1.47)   
-.0317703 
(-3.15)***   
-.0437449 
(-5.44)***   
ln_TA 
.9883704 
(54.16)*** 
.6693715 
(17.87)*** 
.7408202 
(7.27)*** 
.7419477 
(9.99)***   
.8482461 
(22.30)***   
1.014704 
(22.30)*** 
cons 
-.8865232 
(-2.41)** 
5.71875 
(6.87)*** 
3.906071 
(1.82)* 
     .77071 
(0.52) 
2.060177 
(2.39)**   
-.3560421 
(-0.29) 
R^2 
within 
between 
overall 
 
0.8862 
0.9833 
0.9819 
 
0.9165 
0.9217 
0.9188 
 
0.7364 
0.8150 
0.8203 
 
0.7015 
0.9284 
0.9186 
 
0.9390 
0.9684 
0.9656 
 
0.9054 
0.9823 
0.9817 
Wald Test [F test] 
727.84 
[p=0.000] 
156.47 
[p=0.000] 
38.07 
[p=0.000] 
31.44 
[p=0.000] 
205.76 
[p=0.000] 
124.49 
[p=0.000] 
F test [of significane 
of individual effects] 
33.39 
[p=0.000] 
57.59 
[p=0.000] 
15.69 
[p=0.000] 
66.86 
[p=0.000] 
43.54 
[p=0.000] 
54.14 
[p=0.000] 
321  Hfe  0.69924 0.575424 0.580673 0.353669 0.672695 0.717489 
H0: Hfe = 0 
Test F 
634.47 
[p=0.000] 
170.85 
[p=0.000] 
63.84 
[p=0.000] 
29.48 
[p=0.000] 
169.91  
[p=0.000] 
187.04 
[p=0.000] 
H1: Hfe = 1 
Test F 
117.38 
[p=0.000] 
93.01 
[p=0.000] 
33.29 
[p=0.000] 
98.44 
[p=0.000] 
40.22 
[p=0.000] 
29.00 
[p=0.000] 
Note: this table presents Panzar-Rosse H-statistics that depends on time and is calculated with application of FE 
GLS estimator. Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero; in the models of 
monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1; under perfect 
competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition. 
Hfe denotes the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics calculated for consecutive years 2008-2012. The β1, β2, and β3 are 
elasticity coefficients of input prices, i.e. price of deposits, labor and capital, respectively.  This table reports 
coefficients and t–statistics (in parentheses), with *,**,*** representing significance at the 10%,5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
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Table H. Developments of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics over time (estimation – FE 
GLS)  
ln_II_TA 2008-2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ln_AFR 
.4901799 
(29.79)*** 
.4780416 
(10.01)*** 
.5947568 
(11.98)*** 
.3500564 
(7.29)*** 
.5476668 
(12.95)*** 
.6224614 
(12.03)*** 
ln_PPE 
.14803 
(9.78)*** 
.1462696 
(4.66)*** 
.0050466 
(0.09) 
.086183 
(2.83)*** 
.0750668 
(2.34)** 
.1147065 
(3.19)*** 
ln_PCE 
.0646951 
(4.56)*** 
-.063967 
(-2.39)** 
.0316218 
(0.61) 
.0162228 
(0.59) 
.0642331 
(2.21)** 
-.0152293 
(-0.51) 
ln_LNS_TA 
.3150666 
(11.59)***   
-.0138012 
(-0.22)   
.3835976 
(4.51)*** 
.3188393 
(4.77)*** 
.3682678 
(4.97)*** 
.2130149 
(3.03)*** 
ln_DPS_F 
.1287467 
(6.55)*** 
-.0031216 
(-0.06) 
.0231212 
(0.29) 
.4839481 
(4.15)*** 
-.0871584 
(-0.81) 
-.059755 
(-0.49) 
ln_EQ_TA 
-.0434595 
(-4.38)*** 
.0672184 
(1.22) 
.1786788 
(2.27)** 
.0799654 
(1.31) 
.0405267 
(0.95) 
-.0046189 
(-0.15) 
ln_OI_TA 
-.0495534 
(-9.41)*** 
-.0143315 
(-1.66)* 
-.064328 
(-5.39)*** 
-.0125977 
(-1.46) 
-.0366521 
(-3.43)*** 
-.0439967 
(-5.52)*** 
cons 
-1.104434 
(-8.24)*** 
-1.080756 
(-2.65)*** 
-1.37703 
(-2.54)** 
-4.011884 
(-6.80)*** 
-.5377009 
(-0.89) 
-.009478 
(-0,02) 
R^2 
within 
between 
overall 
 
0.6798 
0.7616 
0.7368 
 
0.5316 
0.5230 
0.0494 
 
0.6413 
0.1438 
0.1469 
 
0.5191 
0.4763 
0.4763 
 
0.7632 
0.4784 
0.4798 
 
0.7833 
0.6967 
0.6601 
Wald Test [F test] 
227.12 
[p=0.000] 
18.64 
[p=0.000] 
28.10 
[p=0.000] 
16.65 
[p=0.000] 
49.72 
[p=0.000] 
54.21 
[p=0.000] 
F test [of significane 
of individual effects] 
34.59 
[p=0.000] 
33.92 
[p=0.000] 
15.27 
[p=0.000] 
62.81 
[p=0.000] 
38.89 
[p=0.000] 
54.70 
[p=0.000] 
321  Hfe  0.702905 0.560344 0.631425 0.452462 0.686967 0.721939 
H0: Hfe = 0 
Test F 
670.43 
[p=0.000] 
97.25 
[p=0.000] 
77.76 
[p=0.000] 
54.04 
[p=0.000] 
156.44 
[p=0.000] 
205.13 
[p=0.000] 
H1: Hfe = 1 
Test F 
119.77 
[p=0.000] 
59.87 
[p=0.000] 
26.50 
[p=0.000] 
79.14 
[p=0.000] 
32.48 
[p=0.000] 
30.43 
[p=0.000] 
Note: this table presents Panzar-Rosse H-statistics that depends on time and is calculated with application of FE 
GLS estimator. Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero; in the models of 
monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1; under perfect 
competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition. 
Hfe denotes the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics calculated for consecutive years 2008-2012. The β1, β2, and β3 are 
elasticity coefficients of input prices, i.e. price of deposits, labor and capital, respectively.  This table reports 
coefficients and t–statistics (in parentheses), with *,**,*** representing significance at the 10%,5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
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Table I. Developments of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics over time (estimation techinique  
– two-step GMM).  
ln_II_TA 2008-2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ln_II_TA 
L1. 
.0807785  
(3.55)*** 
-.0343268 
(-0.24) 
-.0375452 
(-0.52)   
.3223629 
(4.53)***   
.060405 
(0.66) 
-.0031935 
(-0.04) 
ln_AFR 
.5335559 
(25.44)*** 
.6158809 
(7.87)*** 
.6120927 
(11.70)***   
.4776826 
(11.72)*** 
.5673053 
(15.87)***   
.5397294 
(11.22)*** 
ln_PPE 
.2112995 
(16.79)*** 
.163983 
(3.49)*** 
.1695185 
(3.41)***    
.134289 
(3.52)*** 
.1588087 
(4.19)*** 
.1562773 
(3.81)*** 
ln_PCE 
-.0148803 
(-1.76)* 
-.0153388 
(-0.38) 
-.0201352 
(-0.44)   
.0004338 
(0.01) 
-.0044383 
(-0.14) 
-.0232209 
(-1.09) 
ln_LNS_TA 
.1395117 
(6.99)*** 
.0938077 
(0.86) 
.1759759 
(1.85)*     
.2002451 
(4.22)*** 
.3109243 
(4.62)*** 
.1623571 
(2.80)*** 
ln_DPS_F 
.0539524  
(-2.15)**   
-.4219215 
(-2.13)**   
-.0080383 
(-0.13)   
-.0000678 
(-0.00) 
-.0604014 
(-1.20) 
-.1534082 
(-2.28)** 
ln_OI_TA 
-.0464487 
(-7.60)***   
-.0204351 
(-2.12)**   
-.0611408 
(-4.45)***   
-.002876 
(-0.21) 
-.0024377 
(-0.28) 
-.0523264 
(-4.07)*** 
cons 
-.0271004 
(-0.15) 
1.323888 
(0.93) 
-.1259294 
(-0.13)   
.3709071 
(0.85) 
.1131545 
(0.20) 
.2317579 
(0.54) 
Wald Test [χ2] 
4521.51 
[p=0.000] 
135.85 
[p=0.000] 
328.98 
[p=0.000] 
594.26 
[p=0.000] 
1309.88 
[p=0.000] 
306.41 
[p=0.000] 
3212  stepH  0.729975 0.764525 0.761476 0.612405 0.721676 0.672786 
H0: H2step = 0 
χ2 Test 
1086.45 
[p=0.000] 
49.51 
[p=0.000] 
102.33 
[p=0.000] 
103.51 
[p=0.000] 
151.30 
[p=0.000] 
112.19 
[p=0.000] 
H1: H2step = 1 
χ2 Test 
148.66 
[p=0.0302] 
4.70 
[p=0.0302] 
10.04 
[p=0.0015] 
41.46 
[p=0.000] 
22.50 
[p=0.000] 
26.54 
[p=0.000] 
Note: this table presents Panzar-Rosse H-statistics that depends on time and is calculated with application of 
two-step Blundell and Bond GMM  estimator. Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal 
to zero; in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 
and 1; under perfect competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher 
degree of competition. H2step denotes the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics calculated for consecutive years 2008-2012. 
The β1, β2, and β3 are elasticity coefficients of input prices, i.e. price of deposits, labor and capital, respectively.  
This table reports coefficients and t–statistics (in parentheses), with *,**,*** representing significance at the 
10%,5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table J. Developments of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics over time (estimation technique 
– one-step GMM). 
ln_II_TA 2008-2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ln_II_TA 
L1. 
.0976505 
(4.07)***   
.1560147 
(1.06)   
.0043815 
(0.07)   
.3202465   
(5.68)*** 
.0481214 
(0.63)   
.0424213 
(1.13)    
ln_AFR 
.5286487 
(31.94)*** 
.6896346 
(9.40)*** 
.5808347 
(13.71)*** 
.5288154 
(10.23)***   
.5539801 
(16.56)*** 
.5462418 
(15.30)***   
ln_PPE 
.2014377 
(14.93)***   
.2470417 
(5.18)***   
.1778101 
(4.51)***   
.134556 
(3.90)***   
.1189704 
(5.72)*** 
.1670227 
(6.61)***   
ln_PCE 
-.0220209 
(-1.94)*   
-.0114327 
(-0.27)   
-.0951468 
(-3.07)***   
.0120749 
(0.29)   
-.0085705 
(-0.46)   
-.0253267 
(-1.15)    
ln_LNS_TA 
.1569258 
(5.35)***   
.0707299 
(0.73)   
.1970415 
(2.38)** 
.1519357 
(1.75)*   
.4182208 
(8.26)***   
.1290177 
(1.93)*   
ln_DPS_F 
.0787877  
(3.70)***   
-.2165083 
(-1.42)   
.0252634 
(0.39) 
.0460347 
(0.95)   
-.0503054 
(-1.20)   
-.2029104 
(-3.41)***   
ln_OI_TA 
-.0481278 
(-10.33)***   
-.0097634 
(-0.83)   
-.0648695 
(-6.08)*** 
-.0179511 
(-1.68)*   
.0124223 
(1.19)   
-.0516855 
(-6.71)***   
cons 
-.1267662 
(-0.96)   
2.080637 
(1.58)   
-.1398267 
(-0.40) 
.4790145 
(1.47)   
-.2759626 
(-0.75)   
.6856679 
(2.30)**   
Wald Test [χ2] 
3491.58 
[p=0.000] 
203.73 
[p=0.000] 
688.42 
[p=0.000] 
845.68 
[p=0.000] 
625.60 
[p=0.000] 
561.37 
[p=0.000] 
3211  stepH  0.708066 0.925244 0.663498 0.675446 0.66438 0.687938 
H0: H1step = 0 
χ2 Test 
910.80 
[p=0.000] 
139.94 
[p=0.000] 
88.64 
[p=0.000] 
81.46 
[p=0.000] 
374.97 
[p=0.000] 
285.89 
[p=0.000] 
H1: H1step = 1 
χ2 Test 
154.83 
[p=0.000] 
0.91 
[p=0.3392] 
22.80 
[p=0.000] 
18.81 
[p=0.000] 
95.69 
[p=0.000] 
58.83 
[p=0.000] 
Note: this table presents Panzar-Rosse H-statistics that depends on time and is calculated with application of 
one-step Arellano and Bond GMM  estimator. Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal 
to zero; in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 
and 1; under perfect competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher 
degree of competition. H2step denotes the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics calculated for consecutive years 2008-2012. 
The β1, β2, and β3 are elasticity coefficients of input prices, i.e. price of deposits, labor and capital, respectively.  
This table reports coefficients and t–statistics (in parentheses), with *,**,*** representing significance at the 
10%,5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
